[Cross-posted] Rick Wagoner has become the casualty of the American car industryâs ﬁnger-pointing with his resignation today, his hand forced by the Obama administration.
The press has centred on this rather than explore the unionâs role in the industryâs difﬁculties. For those of us old enough to remember it, it all smacks a bit of the days of British Leylandâs effective nationalization in the 1970s.
If we look at leadership, perhaps part of Wagonerâs behaviour deserved to be lampooned: catching a private jet to Washington to ask for a bailout wasnât a good look. And itâs true that General Motors did push trucks, but then, so did every one of the American Big Three. Even Toyota joined the Big Three in a lawsuit when California tried to impose fuel economy standards. Everyoneâs been complicit in selling large trucks, even the American mediaâs Japanese-brand heroes.
It is unfair to gloss over some of the good that Wagoner did, when they should be mentioned.
GMâs Adam Opel AG unit has put out some good cars of late, and last year took the Car of the Year award in Europe with its Opel Insignia. Buick sells well in Red China. GM has moved toward a more integrated R&D structure than its rivals at Ford, managing to adopt a model using centres of excellence for engineering platformsâso that the next Opel Corsa will have huge Korean input, and the Chevrolet Camaro was engineered in Australia. The Chevrolet Volt could be a world-beater and GM has been willing to be braver with its R&D processes.
Thereâs a lot that GM can build onâbut maybe someone other than Wagoner should put the next stage into action.
That is, if that person knows what the next stage is.
Itâs in the home market where GM, as Ford, as Chrysler, has been making mistakes. If I could see the need for fuel-efﬁcient cars at the turn of the century for the US market, then thereâs no way the Whiz Kids at these companies couldnât. They were fooled by their own excess.
The real problems are reﬂected in how unmanageable GM has become over the years with its subsidiaries and brands. It has let Saab fail without new modelsâit pales in comparison to the plethora of models Volvo has managed to develop under Ford. Legacy costs with the unions are another problem, which deserves another blog post altogether.
There has been talk over the years about trimming the GM brand portfolio, but I wonder if this is a wise thing.
This is no longer the era when we live by counting beans, but by how brands resonateâand consequently how well they can sell. The problem is not so much that GM has so many brands, but that they have become confusing for customers.
British Leylandâonce the worldâs second largest car manufacturer, and now a mere unit of the Red Chinese governmentâshows what can happen when brands are trimmed.
There, the loss of brands such as Triumph meant that the streamlined Austin Rover Group in the 1980s could not compete in the sports saloon and sports car sectors. As people become more greatly segmented, what a company canât afford to do is lose its brands.
Triumph died with a lot of goodwill still out thereâwhich is why BMW, which acquired the name through taking over Rover in the 1990s, is too scared to ever let the name go. It knows that Triumph occupies the same market it does.
I warned about the demise of the low-cost Plymouth line when DaimlerChrysler killed thatâand I bet Chrysler now wishes it still had it to ﬁeld captive imports or smaller models now for entry-level buyers.
The trick is to ﬁnd a way for the brands to resonate with consumers once more, and no one seems to want to talk about that.
GM knows that to kill a brand it would have massive payouts to make to dealers and lose certain segments of the market to competitors. It would also lose economies of scale, and its cost per unit would rise greatly over the next decade.
The other problem with killing brands is the consumer mindset.
A couple of years ago I talked about brand rationality as the new decade beganânot rationalization. People only want so many brands in their minds and those brands should only offer so many products. It looks like itâs time to explore these very ideas.
Toyota knows this. While in Japan, a country with a very different buyer behaviour to western markets, it offers subcompacts such as Vitz, Ist, Passo, Porte, Raum, bB and Rush, it knows that to export such a wide range would be commercial suicide elsewhere.
It would rather sell more of a certain model, such as the Yaris, while leaving others to be sold under different brand names such as Daihatsu and Scion.
Fordâs greatest success in markets like New Zealand came when people understood the range of EscortâCortinaâFalcon; and even GM itself experienced salesâ growth when it was able to bring some logic to its range there with BarinaâAstraâVectraâCommodore. Toyota took the mantle when it was able to organize StarletâCorollaâCorona in the 1980s. And BMW has been doing it for decades with 3â5â7.
In the US, it makes some sense to ﬁeld Chevrolet, Buick, Cadillac, Pontiac, Saturn and Saab; less so Hummer and GMC, which never made much sense during my lifetime.
In each of these brands, there is a way to ﬁnd an ideal selection of models that the consumer can understand.
GM has already made some headway with this by effectively turning Saturn and Pontiac into import brands, ﬁelding offerings from other parts of its empire that appeal to their buyersâ attitudes toward them. Thereâs no reason this cannot continue: Opel can engineer for Saturn, Holden for Pontiac. It has always amazed me that cars like the Corsa D are not sold Stateside. The Brazilian Chevrolet VectraâAstra H sedan in Europeâcould have been a decent Saturn.
Saturn could have the current models plus Corsa, Meriva B and Zaﬁra; Pontiac might survive on a future rear-wheel-drive mid-sized car and the VE Commodore.
Chevrolet, the all-American brand, has adorned Korean- and Japanese-designed models over the years. Itâs the core line that should ﬁeld a full range, but do three of each type: three passenger car lines, three SUVs and three minivans. Of course, it should keep iconic hero models such as Corvette and Camaro.
Cadillac has become better organized than most with its tiered range. It just needs to improve its quality. It certainly has more cachet than Lincoln.
That leaves Buick and Saab. GM has done its level best to kill Saab. While it should remain it really should be considered alongside Saturn. If Saturn ﬁelds smaller import models, perhaps the Saab name could be used for larger ones. The problem is that competitive, newer models are still some time away. Stateside, GM might not have much choice but to rebadge the Opel Insignia with the Saab name and see if this attractive new model can ﬁnd buyers, as a stopgap. Its large US-only SUV ﬁlls a gap in the market-place as a performance model with some of Saabâs cachet.
Buick, meant to plug the gap between Chevrolet and Cadillac, still needs to do that, and its latest Lacrosse and Lucerne models are competitive for now. Some think that Buick should be China-onlyâjust as Holden is Australasia-only and Vauxhall is UK-onlyâbut we run the danger of losing the premium segment that neither Chevrolet nor Cadillac can sell to.
Cost-wise Buick could continue with smaller models and have a twin spawned off the Holden Commodore platform. Already Buick in China sells the Holden Statesman as the Park Avenue, a far more advanced car than anything sold Stateside with that name. While it may offend Buick loyalists, Chinese exports could sell Statesideâespecially if the choice is killing off the brand versus sustaining it. The quality of models such as the Park Avenue is considered high, and a tiered range of RegalâLacrosseâPark Avenue (or more accurately their successors) could work in the US in the 2010s, just as it does in China today.
The key is to make sure GM cars get sold in as many markets as possible, as sensibly as possible. Itâs just that few have taken a look at GM globally, preferring to base their solutions on what they can chop among the US range. And since GMâs failures have been in part down to its inability to put its international models on sale, it seems foolish to not consider models that the company has already spent billions on elsewhere. Itâs do or die time, and itâs stupid to put the blinkers on just because a vehicle was NIHâNot Invented Hereâin the US.